The purpose of this study is to determine the level of cost stickiness at SG&A cost (Sales, General, and Administrative) and test whether the level of stickiness costs can be reduced through audit quality. The study sample used property, real estate, and building construction industry listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2016-2018 period with a purposive sampling technique, so that the final number of samples obtained was 117 sample observations. This study uses eviews version 10 analysis tool. The results of the study show that every 1% increase in net sales will increase SG&A by 0.610%. Meanwhile, every 1% decrease in net sales will reduce SG&A by (0.610043-0.071380) 0.538%. Furthermore, the research findings show that audit quality can reduce stickiness costs. The implication of this study is that policy makers can use audit quality to reduce stickiness costs.
Introduction
An important factor in measuring financial reporting quality is audit quality. Audit quality is considered to reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. The conflict of interest between shareholders and managers occurs because managers want to fulfill their interests rather than the interests of shareholders ( Jensen &Meckling, 1976 ). Shareholders delegate their authority to managers with the aim of increasing shareholder prosperity. However, managers have a tendency not to meet the interests of shareholders optimally. This delegation of authority provides an opportunity for managers to act opportunistically in meeting their interests. This condition occurs because of information asymmetry. That is, managers have more information than shareholders, so managers can take advantage of that information in meeting their interests.
In conditions of conflict of interest, audit quality plays an important role as a mediator between shareholders and managers. Audit quality reflects the auditor's ability to reduce manager's oportunities as a result of information asymmetry (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983 ). The quality of audits reflected through external audits is an important part of corporate governance (Cohen et al., 2002; and Fan & Wong, 2005) . Previous studies tend to test audit quality with earnings management (Liu, 2009 (Wang, 2011; Jiang et al., 2007) . However, there is still little literature that examines audit quality and cost behavior ( Jiang et al., 2007) . The focus of this research is to test audit quality and cost behavior through cost stickiness. Anderson et al. (2003) explained that the concept of cost stickiness refers to the phenomenon that costs decrease when business activities experience slowdowns, whereas costs increase when business activities experience a significant increase. Based on the concept described by Anderson et al. (2003) , some researchers try to test further about cost stickiness (Chen et al., 2012; Dierynck et al., 2012; Calleja et al., 2006) . The focus of their research relates to the causes of stickiness costs. One of the causes of cost stickiness is manager's opportunistic behavior (Banker et al., 2012;  and Sun & Liu, 2004) . Calleja et al. (2006) show that stickiness costs are higher in France and Germany than in the United States and Britain. Furthermore, Chen et al.
(2012) examined the effect of agency costs between shareholders and managers on stickiness costs and their findings indicate that stickiness costs play an important role in manager incentives (such as free cash flow, managerial tenure, and compensation structure). In addition, the findings also prove that effective corporate governance can reduce this condition. Dierynck et al. (2012) show that executive incentives to conduct earnings management can influence the occurrence of cost stickiness through labor costs. That is, to meet profit targets, managers tend to manipulate labor costs. This condition shows that managers use opportunistic behavior to fulfill their interests. Anderson et al. (2003) explained that companies that have a large percentage of physical assets and human capital tend to have higher stickiness costs because the cost of adjusting these two assets is higher. That is, the cost of adjusting human resources will be higher and affect stickiness costs through increasing labor costs. Liang et al. (2014) explained that audit quality measured through external audits is an important method in corporate governance that can improve monitoring and limit manager's opportunistic behavior and reduce stickiness costs. DOI Thus, this study attempts to fill the void of previous research literature which still rarely tests audit quality and cost stickiness and the effectiveness of audit quality through external audits in reducing stickiness costs.
Theory and hypothesis Development
Cost Stickiness in Property, Real Estate, and Building Construction Industry
The company aims to produce optimal accounting profits to increase shareholder prosperity. However, accounting profits do not guarantee shareholders that the company's business activities have been carried out by managers in accordance with the interests of shareholders. This condition occurs because managers have more information than shareholders. As a result of information asymmetry, managers can behave opportunistically to fulfill their interests ( Jensen &Meckling, 1976) . Motivation managers use this condition to get incentives in the form of bonuses. Opportunistic managers can be done through cost stickiness.
Anderson et al. (2003) explain that cost stickiness occurs when managers intervene
to adjust the level of resources in order to respond to changes in sales. The impact of resource adjustments is the high cost of adjustments when a company's sales experience slowdown compared to when sales increase. Thus, managers need to evaluate the nature of the decline and increase in costs. That is, when managers have doubts that the decline in sales is fixed, then managers tend to retain idle resources. This condition will cause the amount of costs not to decrease much, so that the emergence of stickiness costs. Thus, managers retain idle resources to increase their prosperity compared to the prosperity of shareholders. This is done by managers because managers have the power to control and use resources within the company rather than shareholders. Based on the description described above, the hypothesis proposed in this study is as follows.
H 1 : Sales, general, and administration cost (SG&A)are stickiness.
Audit Qaulity and Cost Stickiness
Agency theory explains that managers are authorized by shareholders to manage the company's business activities. However, as the party managing the company, managers have the motivation not to act in accordance with the interests of shareholders. This condition occurs because managers have opportunistic behavior to fulfill their interests (Shleifer &Vishny, 1997) . Finally, shareholders seek to reduce manager's opportunistic behavior through various monitoring mechanisms such as good corporate governance.
The impact is the existence of cost sacrifice called agency costs ( Jensen &Meckling, 1976 ). Management opportunistic behavior can be identified through cost behavior that fluctuates significantly outside the company's business conditions. Cost behavior is the tendency to change costs to respond to changes in activity volume (Samryn, 2012) . That Year of observation 3
Number of sample observations 117
This study uses audit quality and stickiness cost variables. In addition, to calculate stickiness cost, a net sales variable and a net sales dummy are needed, so that this study uses four variables. The following is a description of the operational definition of the research variable.
Audit Qaulity
Audit quality is the auditor's ability to improve financial reporting quality as evidenced by its ability to reduce agency conflict. This study uses the size of the Big Four and Non-Big Four KAP to measure audit quality. Value 1 for Big Four KAP, and vice versa value 0 for Non-Big Four KAP.
Cost Stickiness
Stickiness cost is the result of intervention of managers who have certain managerial incentives in managing the company's operations (Setiawan, 2018). This study uses SG & A to measure stickiness cost variables. The following are the equations used to measure stickiness cost.
In calculating stickiness costs, net sales are needed. Thus, the equation for measuring net sales is as follows.
= − 1
In addition, this study also requires a net sales dummy variable to measure stickiness cost. The net sales dummy variable is a variable that multiplies the dummy value by comparing net sales in period t with period t-1. The dummy value indicates that there is an increase or decrease in net sales between period t and period t-1. That is, if net sales increase, the dummy variable will be 0, while if net sales decrease, then the dummy variable will be worth 1. Next is the equation to calculate the net sales dummy variable.
The researcher used eviews analysis tool version 10 to test the research hypothesis. In the study, researchers used two econometric equation models to test both hypotheses. 
Results and Discussion
This study uses descriptive statistics to provide an explanation of the research variables used. The following is table 2 showing the descriptive statistics of the research variables during the 2016-2018 period. is supported.
Anderson et al. (2003) explain that cost stickiness occurs when managers intervene
to adjust the level of resources in order to respond to changes in sales. As a result of adjusting the level of resources in order to respond to changes in sales is an increase DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i26.5401 Page 571 ICEMA in the cost of adjustments when the company's sales experience slowdown compared to when sales have increased. This condition will affect the quality of the company's performance fundamentally, so managers need to evaluate the changes in decreases and increase costs. Managers have doubts that the decline in sales is fixed, so managers tend to retain idle resources. This condition will cause the amount of costs not to decrease much, so that the emergence of stickiness costs. Thus, managers retain idle resources to increase their prosperity compared to the prosperity of shareholders. This is done by managers because managers have the power to control and use resources within the company rather than shareholders.
Testing the second hypothesis (H 2 ), namely, audit quality can reduce the stickiness cost level using all three paired testing models, namely, (1) common effect, (2) are the three paired tests to estimate audit quality to reduce stickiness cost levels. Table 6 shows the results of quality audit tests to reduce stickiness cost levels.
Based on the table, it can be seen that the coefficient of β1> 0 is equal to 0.615861, the coefficient of β2 <0 is equal to -0.103787, and the value of the coefficient β3> 0 is equal to 0.173553. Therefore, the researchers concluded that every 1% increase in net sales would increase SG&A by 0.615%, and the existence of an audit quality would reduce SG & A by 0.173% at a 1% decrease in net sales. Meanwhile, every 1% decrease in net sales will reduce SG&A by (0.615861-0.103787) 0.512%. Thus, audit quality can reduce the level of stickiness costs, so the second hypothesis (H 2 ) is supported. Managers are authorized by shareholders to manage the company's business activities. However, as the party that manages the company, managers have the motivation to act opportunistically in meeting their interests, so that the interests of shareholders become neglected (Shleifer &Vishny, 1997) . This condition can be detrimental to shareholders, so to reduce manager's opportunistic behavior, the role of corporate governance becomes important. Implementation of corporate governance through the implementation of audit quality creates new costs. That is, the impact of implementing audit quality is the existence of cost sacrifice called agency costs ( Jensen &Meckling, 1976 ). However, audit quality is needed to suppress manager's opportunistic behavior. Management opportunistic behavior can be identified through cost behavior that fluctuates significantly outside the company's business conditions. Cost behavior is the tendency to change costs to respond to changes in activity volume (Samryn, 2012) .
That is, costs change according to the volume of business activities of the company.
However, Anderson et al. (2003) explained that costs change disproportionately to changes in the volume of a company's business activities.
The main cause of cost stickiness is manager's opportunistic behavior (Banker et al., 2011) . Delegation of authority from shareholders to managers gives negative implications that shareholders must pay a large amount to obtain comprehensive information about the company's operational business activities managed by the manager. This condition occurs because managers have a tendency to utilize a number of company assets in meeting their interests rather than increasing company value (Stulz, 1990; and Jensen, 1986 
Conclusion
This study aims to estimate and analyze the role of audit quality in reducing stickiness This study has several limitations and can be used as consideration in future studies.
These limitations can be explained by the following (1) Based on the description of the limitations that the researcher has described earlier, this study has several suggestions as considerations in subsequent research. The suggestion can be described by the researcher as follows (1) further research can use a more complex sample of mining or manufacturing companies to detect manager's opportunistic behavior in making cost stickiness. In addition, further research can extend the period of research, (2) further research can use other audit quality proxies such as auditor specialization, and (3) further research can use a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods through a triangulation approach to get better results.
